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PROPERLY FUNDING THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE:
THE CASE FOR SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENTIATED FEES

Robert Brauneis*

Through its registration and recordation programs, the United States
Copyright Office provides crucial information about the authorship, ownership,
and copyright status of millions of works of authorship created over the last
century. Peter Jaszi, to whom this Festschrift is dedicated, recognized this a
quarter-century ago when he defended registration requirements as a member of
the Library of Congress’s Advisory Committee on Copyright Registration and
Deposit: “the registration record provides a valuable database available to large
and small participants in the copyright marketplace.”1 However, the Copyright
Office is seriously underfunded, compromising all of its functions, including
registration and recordation.2 The essentially flat, front-end fees that the Office
charges for registration and recordation fail to generate nearly enough revenue
for the Office to survive, let alone thrive. Because the Office depends on
Congress to appropriate taxpayer dollars to fund over a third of its budget,3 and
*

Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program, The George
Washington University Law School. For useful comments and important information, I would
like to thank Steven Berk, Dmitry Karshtedt, and Zvi Rosen; for financial support, I would like
to thank Dean Blake Morant; and for inspiration, I would like to thank Peter Jaszi, to whom this
paper, as my contribution to Peter’s Festschrift, is dedicated.
1
Library of Congress Advisory Committee on Copyright Registration and Deposit, ACCORD:
Report of the Co-Chairs, The Library of Congress Advisory Committee on Registration and
Deposit, Robert Wedgeworth, Barbara Ringer, Co-Chairs (hereinafter “ACCORD Report,”
Appendix A/16 (1993); see id. Appendix A/85, A/86 (Jon Baumgarten & Peter Jaszi, “Why
Section 412 Should be Retained,” Working Paper #4a, July 12, 1993).
2
As the Office itself has put it, it “has long operated on a shoestring budget.” United States
Copyright Office, Positioning the United States Copyright Office for the Future: Strategic Plan
2016-2020 (hereinafter “Copyright Office Strategic Plan,” at 43 (December 1, 2015), available
at https://www.copyright.gov/reports/strategic-plan/USCO-strategic.pdf.
3
The exact percentage changes from year to year. The percentage also varies depending upon
whether the Licensing Division, which administers compulsory licenses and is fully funded by
fees, is included in calculations. So, for example, in Fiscal Year 2014, if the Licensing Division
is included with the Copyright Royalty Judges and the remainder of the Copyright Office, fees
provided 64.8% of the Copyright Office Execution Plan budget; if the Licensing Division is not
included, fees provided 62.2% of the budget. See Library of Congress Fiscal 2016 Budget
Justification, at 7.
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depends on its parent agency, the Library of Congress, to request those
appropriations, it is chronically short of funds. As a result, the copyright
information that the Copyright Office collects and provides is both significantly
incomplete and terribly inconvenient to access, and the Office’s other functions
suffer as well.
The Copyright Office has traditionally opposed efforts to render it
financially self-sufficient. Its principal worry has been that self-sufficiency
would require sharply increased registration fees – “by at least a factor of five,
from $20 to the $100 range,” testified Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters
in 19964 – which in turn would overburden copyright owners and lead to a steep
decline in the use of the registration system.5 There is no reason, however, to
treat the Copyright Office’s current flat, front-end fee structure as sacrosanct. It
could easily be considered puzzling, rather than obvious, why an applicant
should pay the same amount in registration fees for a song that continues to
generate substantial revenue 80 years after it was first published, and for a song
that was never commercially successful, or to pay the same to register a motion
picture with a budget of $200 million and first week box office receipts of $220
million,6 and to register a short story created by one person in a week.
Moreover, there is strong modern domestic precedent for significantly
differentiated intellectual property fees, both across time and across different
assets and applicants. Congress took significant steps towards differentiated
fees for patents and trademarks in the 1980s, instituting “back-end” maintenance
fees for utility patents in 1980,7 creating small entity discounts for patent fees in

4

Omnibus Patent Act of 1996; Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Senate, 104th Cong.,
2nd Sess., Serial No. J-104-97, at 19 (1996) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights). The Office of Management and Budget criticized Register Peters’s estimate of a
five-fold increase in fees, and she later came to the conclusion that, at least if the Copyright
Office remained within the Library of Congress, fees would only have to be doubled. See United
States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate, Intellectual Property: Fees Are Not Always Commensurate With the Costs of Services
43-47 (criticizing Copyright Office cost projections), 49 (noting that Register Peters later stated
that fees would have to double for the Office to become self-sustaining within the Library of
Congress) (May 1997).
5
See id.
6
I’m thinking of “Rogue One: A Star Wars Story,” see http://www.thenumbers.com/movie/Rogue-One-A-Star-Wars-Story#tab=summary, but of course similar
figures could be cited for many movies.
7
See P.L. 96-517, §2, 94 Stat. 3015 (December 12, 1980) (providing for maintenance fees due
at three years and six months, seven years and six months, and eleven years and six months after
issuance, for utility patents based on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980); id.
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1982,8 and increasing the frequency of trademark registration renewal from 20
years to 10 years in 1988.9 In 2012, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
created further discounts for “micro entities.”10 As a result, a patent applicant
can end up paying as little as $640 and as much as $15,160 for a simple issued
patent11 – a ratio of about 1:24 – depending on the applicant’s size and on the
desired patent duration. Although there is somewhat less differentiation in
trademark fees, an applicant for a trademark registration currently pays between
$225 and $400 for a single-class registration on the front end, but must also pay
back-end fees, in the amount of $500 per class every ten years, to maintain the
registration.12
That fee differentiation fulfills three important goals. First, it provides
ample funds for optimal administration of the patent and trademark systems. The
Patent and Trademark Office is entirely fee-funded, and has been since 1990.13
Those fees are sufficient to support its direct services to applicants, its nonservice activities that support the patent and trademark systems, and needed
capital improvements. Moreover, the PTO’s patent and trademark activities each
stand on their own, since the PTO is prohibited by law from diverting funds from
one to the other in either direction.14 Second, it goes some of the way towards
spreading the cost of the patent and trademark systems according to the benefits
received from them. Third, it increases affordability on the low end, making it
possible to obtain patent rights for many relatively modest and unproven
inventions, and to obtain the benefits of trademark registration for relatively
modest and unproven brands.

8

See P.L. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317 (Aug. 27, 1982).
See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, P.L. 100-667, §§ 110-111, 102 Stat. 3935 (Nov. 16,
1988). This Act became effective one year after it was passed. See id. § 136. Thus, registrations
or renewals issued on or after November 16, 1989 last only for ten years, instead of the twenty
years they had previously lasted.
10
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, P.L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 316, § 10(b) (September 16,
2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41 note) (hereinafter “America Invents Act”).
11
See United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Fee Schedule, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule
(last
visited November 20, 2016). $640 is the sum of application, search, examination, and issuance
fees for a micro entity; $15,160 is the sum of those fees, plus maintenance fees, without any
discount.
12
See id.
13
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Public Law 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388-1,
1388-391; Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Study of Alternative Fee
Structures, 65 Fed. Reg. 58746, 58747 (October 2, 2000).
14
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 42(c)(3)(a), 42(c)(3)(B); America Invents Act, supra note 10, § 10(a)(2).
9
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In this article, I argue that the Copyright Office should follow the
example of the Patent and Trademark Office, and charge significantly
differentiated fees for registration and recordation. Just as patent and trademark
fees are, those fees should be differentiated across time – over the life of a
copyright – by splitting payment up into “front-end” fees imposed at the time of
application, and “back-end” fees charged for renewal. They should also be
differentiated across different works and applicants at the same time. In addition,
I argue that the Copyright Office should be able to set fees based, not just on
current costs of services rendered, but also on anticipated capital improvement
costs, and on the cost of non-service activities that support the copyright system,
such as the preparation of reports on copyright issues and the provision of public
information about copyright law.
Whether differentiated copyright fees can provide ample funds for an
entirely self-supporting Copyright Office is an open question, and it will need to
remain open for some time. It is very unlikely that “front-end” fee
differentiation alone could provide sufficient funding. As will be discussed
further below, “back-end” renewal fees would and should probably only be
imposed on new registrations, with the result that back-end revenue would not
start flowing until those fees came due on new registrations. Thus, if the first
requirement for renewal were fixed at ten years, as it is for trademark
registrations, it would be ten years before the Copyright Office began to receive
revenue from those fees. In the meantime, the Copyright Office would need to
continue to rely on supplemental appropriations, and indeed, as the Office’s
most recent Technology Modernization Plan contemplates,15 would need
increased appropriations for there to be any hope of remedying the deficiencies
in its operations.
Although it would take years to fully implement differentiated fees, such
fees would eventually produce a wide variety of benefits. They would enable
the Copyright Office to better fulfill all of its missions; they would make
registration and recordation more affordable for modest applicants and works,
thus enlarging the stock of copyright information provided by the Copyright
Office; and they would decrease or eliminate reliance on taxpayer support of the
Office. Proposals for changing fee structures and for becoming self-funding
have sometimes been linked to changes in the institutional status of the Office,

15

See United States Copyright Office, Provisional Information Technology Modernization
Plan and Cost Analysis, at 2 (February 29, 2016), available at
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/itplan/technology-report.pdf.
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such as becoming part of a combined Intellectual Property Corporation,16 or
becoming an independent agency.17 However, they need not be, and in this
article, which takes no position on the Office’s institutional status, they are not.
Regardless of whether the Copyright Office remains part of the Library of
Congress, fee and funding changes are important and would be helpful.
Part I describes some of the current deficiencies in Copyright Office
operations, to acquaint the reader with the consequences of underfunding. Part
II describes the Copyright Office’s current fee structure, and contrasts it with the
relatively recently developed differentiated fee structure of the Patent and
Trademark Office. Part III explores how the Copyright Office could charge
differentiated fees. It begins by outlining the treaty obligations that would place
limitations on certain types of copyright fees. It then considers a variety of ways
that the Office could differentiate fees, both across time and across different
applicants and works, while remaining in compliance with treaty obligations.
Lastly, it takes a first stab at considering whether differentiated fees could really
generate enough additional revenue to make the Copyright Office self-sufficient,
and whether that is a desirable goal. Part IV concludes.
I. WHAT AN UNDERFUNDED COPYRIGHT OFFICE LOOKS LIKE
The Copyright Office is quite aware of what it could and should be doing
with respect to provision of copyright information. The second goal stated in its
2016-2020 Strategic Plan is to “[m]ake copyright records easily searchable and
widely available to authors, entrepreneurs, and all who need them,”18 and as we
will see, it has also articulated more specific objectives that make perfect sense.
Yet the Office is also aware that has not had sufficient resources to accomplish
those objectives, however far it has tried to stretch the resources it has had. Thus,
its operations still have easily recognized deficiencies, as well as less easily
recognized unfulfilled potential. Three areas of evident deficiencies involve
document recordation, pre-1978 registration records, and post-1978 registration
records.
A. PAPER DOCUMENTS ONLY
The Copyright Act designates the Copyright Office as the official public
registry of documents that convey interests in works of authorship, such as

16

See Omnibus Patent Act of 1996, S. 1961, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, (introduced July 2, 1996).
See Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act, H.R. 4241, 114 th Cong., 1st Sess.
(introduced December 11, 2015).
18
Copyright Office Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at 6.
17
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copyright assignments and licenses.19 The Copyright Office thus functions like
an office of Recorder of Deeds does for real estate, but while Recorder of Deeds
offices are local – their jurisdiction is usually limited to a single county – the
Copyright Office serves as the only public registry in the United States for
copyright documents. Surprisingly, the Copyright Office still only accepts paper
documents for recording, just as it has since 1870, when it was not a separate
office but merely a division of the Library of Congress, and the Library first
assumed the function of a public registry of copyright documents. 20 In this
respect the Copyright Office is over a decade behind the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), which launched its Electronic Trademark Assignment System in
2003, and its Electronic Patent Assignment System in 2004.21 It is also behind
most local Recorders of Deeds offices in the United States, over 1500 of which
have implemented electronic recording systems.22
A series of unfortunate consequences flow from the Copyright Office’s
failure to implement an electronic recording system. Paper-based recording is
labor intensive. The Copyright Office uses about the same number of staff to
process 11,000 documents per year as the PTO does to process 480,000
documents per year.23 The additional staff are needed principally because
information from each paper document must be manually transcribed to create
an electronic index. Manual transcription is so time consuming that even though
the Copyright Office has a proportionally larger staff, in the years 2008-2012
there was an average delay of 225 days between submission of a submitted
copyright document and its appearance in the electronic index on the Copyright
Office’s website,24 while electronically submitted patent documents typically
appear on the PTO’s website within a single day.25 Manual transcription is also
expensive, which has led to the current charge of $105 per document recorded,
plus $35 for each ten additional titles of works that are covered by the
document.26 Such high charges undoubtedly reduce the number of documents
19

See 17 U.S.C. § 205.
See Robert Brauneis, Transforming Document Recordation at the Copyright Office 11 (2014)
(hereinafter
Transforming
Document
Recordation),
available
at
http://copyright.gov/docs/recordation/recordation-report.pdf (last visited November 25, 2016).
21
See id. at 56.
22
See Property Records Industry Association, http://www.pria.us/ (home page, stating that 1570
recorders of deeds have implemented an electronic recording system) (last visited November 25,
2016).
23
See Transforming Document Recordation, supra note 20, at 56.
24
See id. at 35.
25
See id. at 99.
26
See United States Copyright Office, Circular 4: Copyright Office Fees (Rev. 11/2016),
available at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ04.pdf.
20
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recorded. By contrast, since 2014, the PTO’s fee for recording patent
assignments electronically is zero.27 The Copyright Office badly needs an
electronic recording system.28
B. UNSEARCHABLE PRE-1978 REGISTRATIONS
Until 1978, the Copyright Office’s registration index was maintained
entirely on paper. Almost 40 years later, the pre-1978 index is still only
available on paper, which means that it cannot be searched electronically. That
is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, millions of works that gained
federal copyright protection from 1923 onwards are still under copyright, yet
official copyright information about those works, including their authors and
owners, can only be gained through manual search of the approximately 12
million original registration records covering works registered from 1923
through 1977.29 Second, millions of works that gained federal copyright
protection from 1923 through 1963 are not under copyright, because no renewal
registrations were filed for those works, as was then required to maintain
copyright protection beyond an initial 28-year term. Only about 1.2 million
renewal registrations were granted between 1950 and 1992,30 leaving the vast
majority of works that gained federal copyright protection after 1922 in the
public domain. Although those works are in theory free to be used by anyone,
many of them are not widely known to be available, because their public domain
status can only be confirmed by a search of the Copyright Office’s paper records.
Efforts have been underway since 2010 to create an electronic index of pre-1978
records, and the Office’s current strategic plan includes such an index as a
performance objective.31 The Copyright Office has scanned about 37 million
index cards, and is starting to transcribe information from those cards.32
However, those efforts are proceeding slowly, because only limited funds are
27

See 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4240 (Jan. 18, 2013) (announcing the reduction of the fee for recording
electronically to zero); USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 11 (current fee for recording
electronically is zero). The fee for recording a document submitted on paper is currently $40.
See id.
28
Interestingly, the Copyright Office Strategic Plan does not speak specifically of a recording
system that is capable of accepting documents electronically, but only of a “modern system for
recording commercial and noncommercial copyright documents.” See Copyright Office
Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at 11.
29
See Copyright Registrations and Renewals – 1870-2016 (Excel Spreadsheet compiled by Zvi
Rosen, on file with author).
30
See id.
31
See Copyright Office Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at 18.
32
Information about the digitization project is available on the Copyright Office’s Digitization
and Public Access page, https://www.copyright.gov/digitization/status.html.
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available. In its Fiscal Year 2010 budget request, the Library of Congress set a
“key performance target” of having at least 10 million pre-1978 records online
by September 30, 2010.33 Over six years after that deadline has passed, not a
single pre-1978 record is online.
C. DELAY, ABRIDGMENT, AND OMISSIONS IN POST-1978 REGISTRATIONS
Since 1978, the Copyright Office has maintained an electronic catalog of
new registrations, which is now searchable online. The information available in
that catalog, however, is of uneven quality. The Copyright Office began to cut
back on the information it entered into catalog records in the 1990s. 34 Those
initial cutbacks, however, were not sufficient to keep cataloguing current. In the
mid- to late-1990s, budget constraints led to staff reductions, which by the year
1999 resulted in a six- to eight-month backlog in examining and cataloging
applications.35 In order to reduce the cataloging backlog, the Office further
reduced the information added to each catalog record, using what were known
as “trim orders,” and for some periods dispensed with recording any information
from the deposit copy submitted with the registration application, instead
directing catalogers to enter information only from the application.36 The result
is a large number of records in the electronic catalog that have very thin
information, and that in some cases make it more difficult to identify the work
that has been registered. Although the registration backlog was substantially
reduced by the mid-2000s, it increased again in the late 2000s, due in part to
another wave of budget constraints and staff reductions.37
Since 2008, the Office has maintained an electronic registration system,
which accepts registration applications online. Although this achievement is
laudable, the system still has gaps. For example, in spite of the statutory
mandate that applications for registration include “the name and nationality or

33

See Library of Congress Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Justification, p. 141, available at
https://www.loc.gov/portals/static/about/reports-and-budgets/documents/budgets/fy2010.pdf.
34
See Margaret Holley, Copyright Office Makes Final Decision on Catalog Record, available
at http://www.guild2910.org/CopyrightCatalog.pdf.
35
See Fiscal 2000 Budget Request, Statement of Marybeth Peters, The Register of Copyrights,
before the Subcommittee on Legislative Branch, Committee on Appropriations, United States
House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st Session (February 10, 1999) available at
https://copyright.gov/docs/regstat99.html.
36
See id.
37
See Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights, Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, at
47 (2010), available at https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2009/ar2009.pdf (noting that
the average time for processing registrations rose from 81 days in 2007, to 163 days in 2008, to
309 days in 2009).
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domicile of the author or authors” of the works covered,38 the Copyright Office
has established a practice of accepting some registration applications with
radically incomplete authorship information. Authorship information is
important. The basic term of copyright in a work is measured by the life of the
author,39 so if we don’t know who the author is, we have no way of figuring out
whether the work is still under copyright. Moreover, authors are initial owners
of copyright40 and generally have a non-waivable power to terminate transfers
of copyright they have made, typically 35 to 40 years after the transfer in
question.41 Thus, without knowing who the author of a work is, we don’t know
who might own copyright in that work if the registration claimant either did not
properly obtain rights or obtained rights only for the purpose of registration, nor
do we know who may be able to terminate any transfer that was made.
The practice of accepting incomplete authorship information began
gathering steam in 1980, when the Copyright Office started to accept
applications to register collective works and serials without complete authorship
information, so long as a single entity owned copyright in all of their
components.42 In what was likely the typical case at the time, this practice may
have seemed justifiable. A magazine publisher acquires copyright in a number
of articles, each written by a different author, and publishes them in one issue of
a magazine. The registration application lists only the publisher as author (of
the collective work, because it selected and arranged the articles) and as claimant
(as author of the collective work, and as assignee of copyright in the individual
articles). Yet the published copies of the magazine themselves credit each
author of each article, so there is a public record of authorship, even if it is not
in the registration records, and the magazine publisher retains copyright in the
articles, so the registration’s identification of the claimant remains accurate for
a long time.
More recently, however, applicants have started to use the registration
system in ways that make the consequences of failing to provide authorship
information much more serious. In a frequently litigated typical case, a stock
photography agency acquires copyright in hundreds or thousands of photographs
38

17 U.S.C. § 409(2).
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (establishing a general copyright term of life of the author plus 70
years for works created on or after January 1, 1978).
40
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
41
See 17 U.S.C. § 203.
42
See Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 747 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting a declaration from the Associate Register for Registration and Recordation of
the United States Copyright Office to that effect).
39
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taken by dozens of photographers, but only for the purpose of registration;
copyright will revert to those photographers immediately after registration.43
The agency applies to register a single compilation or “automated database” that
includes all of those photographs. It provides the names of only three of the
photographers, and does not identify which photographs they have taken. The
Copyright Office issues the registration, conferring all of the benefits of
registration on the photographs, including the ability to file a lawsuit if any of
them is infringed, and to obtain statutory damages and attorney’s fees. However,
the Office has not obtained any useful authorship or ownership information –
we don’t know who took any of the photographs, nor who owns them once
copyright reverts to their authors immediately after registration. Moreover,
there is likely no other public record or authorship or ownership – few if any of
the photos has been published with attribution or copyright notice, and even if
they have, the registration doesn’t say where they have been so published (unlike
the registration for the magazine issue, which did). The result is that the
copyright landscape becomes seeded with landmines — works the use of which
can be punished with statutory damages and attorney’s fees, but about which
there is no useful record of authorship, ownership, or copyright status.
Why have courts validated this Copyright Office practice? An important
factor is the Copyright Office’s limited budget. As a 2014 Ninth Circuit decision
noted, before the introduction of electronic registration in 2008, a practical
argument for accepting limited authorship information was “the expensive and
error-prone tedium of the Copyright Office typing all the names [of authors] into
its records.”44 Even now that electronic registration has been introduced,
“questions remain about the capacity of the system to accommodate applications
listing very large numbers of authors or titles.”45 In short, the limited resources
of the Copyright Office have become an excuse not to provide essential

43

For cases that present variations on these facts, see Alaska Stock, LLC, 747 F.3d at 673-675;
Metropolitan Regional Information Systems, Inc. v. American Home Realty Network, Inc.,
722 F.3d 591, 596-600 (4th Cir. 2013); Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt Pub. Co., 712 F.Supp.2d 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Muench Photography, Inc. v. Pearson
Education, Inc., 2013 WL 6185200 at *10 (N.D. Cal. November 19, 2013); Pacific Stock, Inc.
v. Pearson Education, Inc., 2012 WL 93182, *4-*5 (D. Haw. January 11, 2012); Panoramic
Stock Images, Ltd. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014 WL 4344095, at *8 (N.D. Ill. September
2, 2014).
44
Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 747 F.3d 673, 681 (9th Cir. 2014).
45
Id. at 682.
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information about who created the works that are granted the benefits of
registration.46
D. UNFULFILLED POTENTIAL
So far, I have described three of the Copyright Office’s most obvious
deficiencies in collecting and providing copyright information. But there is
much more that the Copyright Office could do to better perform those functions.
For example, it could provide an application programming interface to the
Copyright Office Electronic Catalog, the Office’s electronic catalog of copyright
registrations, recorded documents, and other transactions, so that any software
developer who wanted to could build applications that would integrate current
copyright information.47 Music streaming services such as Spotify and Pandora
could provide information about the copyright of the songs they play. Image
search engines such as Google Images and TinEye could provide copyright
information about images. Google Books could provide copyright information
about books; IMDB about movies; and so on. Independent software developers
could also improve on the cumbersome, limited web search capabilities for the
Catalog provided by the Copyright Office.48 The result would be more readily
available copyright information, and increased awareness of copyright and of
the availability of copyright registration.
The Copyright Office could also work with the developers of authoring
software – image editing software such as Adobe Photoshop or GIMP, video
editing software such as Avid Media Composer or Adobe Premiere Pro, audio
software such as ProTools or Audacity, text editing software such as Microsoft
Word – to link directly to online copyright registration from the software: done
with your work? Register it! By making the opportunity to register more
conspicuous, and the registration process easier, the Office could increase the

46

To its credit, the Copyright Office is trying to discourage the practice of registering large
groups of photographs as automated databases. It is proposing to adopt a narrow definition of
“automated database,” under which only databases that are accessible solely through a search
tool would count as automated databases. See Registration of Group Photographs, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 81 Fed. Reg. 86643, 86654 (December 1, 2016). It also cautions that
registration of a group of photographs as a compilation may mean that only one award of
statutory damages is available for the entire compilation, no matter how many individual items
are infringed. See id.
47
See Copyright Office Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at 18 (one of the performance objectives in
the Copyright Office’s Strategic Plan is that “business-to-business services offered by the Office
will share data and connect public and private copyright records”).
48
See http://cocatalog.loc.gov/.
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number of works registered and therefore the reach of its catalog of works under
copyright.49
II. FEE STRUCTURES, ALLOWABLE COST RECOVERY, AND RESERVE
AUTHORITIES: CONTRASTING THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE
WITH THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Current Copyright Office fees differ from Patent and Trademark Office
fees in four important ways: the timing of the fees; the variation in rates for
different applicants; the costs the fees are allowed to cover; and the agency’s
ability to hold those fees in a reserve fund.
A. FRONT- AND BACK-END FEES
First and most strikingly, the Copyright Office fees are all “front-end” –
they are single charges at the time of service. By contrast, the Patent and
Trademark Office assesses significant “back-end” fees – in the case of patents,
maintenance fees at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after the date of issue,50 and in the
case of trademarks, renewal fees every 10 years after registration.51 The PTO
pursues a conscious policy of setting “front-end” fees below cost, and “backend” fees above cost. For example, the utility patent search and examination
fees are set at $600 and $720 respectively (without further discounts for small
and micro entities);52 the estimated average cost for those activities is, as of
Fiscal Year 2015, $1773 and $2205, respectively. 53 The large-entity fee for
issuance of a granted patent, however, is $960,54 well above the FY 2015
estimated unit cost of $314,55 and the maintenance fees – $1600 due at 3.5 years

49

Other suggestions include allowing independent registrars to offer registration services, as is
the current practice with domain names. See Pamela Samuelson & Members of the Copyright
Principles Project, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 Berkeley Tech.
L. J. 1175, 1203-1204 (2010), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/563.
Independent registrars, including trade associations, would no doubt find alternative methods of
promoting registration, and likely increase the number of registrations substantially. Providing
independent registrars access to back-end registration processes or the official database (catalog)
of registrations, however, would also require a much more complicated and secure system.
50
See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b).
51
See 15 U.S.C. § 1059.
52
See USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 11.
53
See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Table of Patent Fees – Current, Proposed and
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https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Table%20of%20Patent%20Fees%20%20Current,%20Proposed%20and%20Unit%20Cost.pdf.
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after issuance, $3600 due at 7.5 years, and $7400 due at 11.5 years56 – have only
a minimal cost of collection. This has been a conscious policy at the PTO for
over 30 years. As the PTO stated in a recent notice proposing a new fee schedule,
Many of the initial filing fees are intentionally set below unit cost in
order to foster innovation by removing barriers to entry for innovators.
To balance the aggregate revenue loss of fees set below cost, other fees
must be set above cost in areas where it is less likely to reduce
inventorship (e.g., maintenance).57
The combination of lower front-end fees and higher back-end fees doesn’t just
foster innovation; it also likely maximizes PTO revenue. Demand for front-end
services is almost certainly more price-sensitive, or elastic, and hence an
increase in front-end fees would result in a greater decrease in applications, thus
decreasing revenue. The back-end fees generate a very substantial portion of
total PTO revenue; in Fiscal Year 2016, 42.5% of all patent revenue came from
maintenance fees.58 Without that revenue, the PTO would be utterly unable to
maintain its patent operations.
The skew towards back-end fees is not quite as dramatic for trademarks,
but it is still significant. The current initial full-price fee for registering
electronically a trademark for a single class of goods or services – $40059 – is
somewhat less than the PTO’s estimated average cost of examination and
issuance – $473 in Fiscal Year 2015.60 The fee for renewal every ten years –
$300 when submitted electronically61 – is almost ten times the $31 FY 2015
56
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See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Application Fee Structure,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/filing-online/trademark-applicationfee-structure.
60
See United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Trademark Fee Adjustment Table of
Trademark Fees – Current, Final Rule, and Unit Cost (hereinafter “Table of Trademark Fees”),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Table%20of%20Trademark%20Fees%20%20Current%2C%20Final%20Rule%20and%20Unit%20Cost%20082516.pdf
61
See USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 11.
57

13

average cost to the PTO of processing that renewal.62 Although only about 9%
of the trademark revenue of the PTO comes from renewals proper, about 24%
of its revenue comes from what it calls fees for “maintaining exclusive rights,”
which include renewal fees, fees for filing affidavits of use under Section 8 of
the Lanham Act (which must be filed within the fifth and sixth year of
registration to maintain that registration), fees for filing “incontestability”
affidavits under Section 15, and other related fees.63
B. VARIATION IN RATES FOR DIFFERENT APPLICANTS
The Copyright Act would seem to grant the Copyright Office significant
power to vary fees charged to different applicants for similar services. While §
708(b)(2) provides that fees shall be set at rates “not more than that necessary to
cover the reasonable costs incurred by the Copyright Office for [registration,
recordation, and other] services,”64 that limitation is best read to operate on the
aggregate level, and not to require that the fee charged to each applicant be no
larger than the costs of providing services to that applicant. In confirmation of
the Copyright Office’s power to vary fees by type of work and applicant, §
708(b)(4) provides that “fees established under this subsection shall be fair and
equitable and give due consideration to the objectives of the copyright
system.”65 In 2014, the Copyright Office introduced a $35 fee for “single”
copyright registrations (single work, single author/claimant), discounted from
the standard rate of $55, after considering the objectives of the copyright system.
As it said in explaining its introduction of the fee, “[t]he Office understands that
works of independent creators fuel the nation’s economy and are critical to the
Library of Congress’ collections. Moreover, if individual authors do not register
and are not part of the public database, they – more than any other group of
copyright owners – may be difficult to find.”66 The Office has also provided for
certain types of group registrations, which can be viewed as discounts for
included works. However, it has made relatively little use of its authority to vary
fees. There is more variation in patent fees; as noted above, the Patent Act itself
62

See Table of Trademark Fees, supra note 60.
See Trademark Fee Adjustment Aggregate Revenue Estimates: NPRM Proposal, available at
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United States Copyright Office, Proposed Schedule and Analysis of Copyright Fees to Go Into
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provides for 50% discounts for certain fees for “small” entities, and 75%
discounts for “micro” entities.67 There are discounts for filing trademark
applications in a way that simplifies their processing by the PTO – so-called
“TEAS Plus” and “TEAS Reduced Fee” applications68 – but trademark
registration fees are not otherwise discounted by entity type.
C. RECOVERING THE COST OF NON-SERVICE ACTIVITIES
AND CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS
The Copyright Office cannot set registration and recordation fees –
which “together generat[e] well over 90% percent of the Office’s fee receipts”69
– any higher than is necessary to cover the cost, in the aggregate, of those
services. As noted above, § 708(b)(2) of the Copyright Act empowers the Office
to adjust registration and recordation fees “to not more than that necessary to
cover the reasonable costs incurred by the Copyright Office for [those]
services.”70 As a result, the Office cannot raise revenue to cover the cost of
performing its other statutory functions, which are important to maintaining the
copyright system but are not directly related to client services. 71 These include
advising Congress, other federal agencies, and the courts on copyright law;
participating in international meetings; conducting studies on various aspects of
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copyright law; conducting educational programs; and conducting DMCA
exemption rulemakings.72
By contrast, the Patent and Trademark Office is empowered to set fees
adequate to “recover the aggregate estimated costs to the Office for processing,
activities, services, and materials relating to patents (in the case of patent fees)
and trademarks (in the case of trademark fees).”73 The words “activities” and
“materials” are the crucial ones. They enable the PTO to set fees adequate to
cover, not just the cost of its services to patent and trademark applicants and
holders, but the cost of everything it does to support the patent and trademark
systems, including all of its advisory, research, and educational activities that
are not directly related to providing patent and trademark services.
The authority to charge fees that in the aggregate cover more than the
cost of services provided may be somewhat illusory when considered only in
relationship to front-end fees. As noted above, the PTO typically sets front-end
fees below cost, and so it doesn’t matter that they could be set above cost. The
Copyright Office also sets its front-end fees below cost. For example, the Office
estimated that by implementing its proposed 2014 registration fees, it “would
recover 71% of the costs of processing electronic claims and 66% of the costs
of processing paper applications.”74 It is only by imposing above-cost back-end
fees that the PTO covers, not only the full cost of its services, but the cost of its
other activities in support of the patent and trademark systems.
Former Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante has been among those
who have stated that the Copyright Office does not have the authority to set fees
based on the cost of capital improvements.75 It is not quite clear whether this is
so. As noted, the Copyright Office has the power to recover the cost of providing
services, and arguably the cost of providing services should include the cost of
making needed improvements to the infrastructure required to provide those
services. Surely the Office should not be doomed to paper-based processing
because “cost” does not include the cost of implementing electronic processing,
suitably amortized. However, any such limitation would also currently seem to
be merely theoretical, because the Copyright Office sets most fees at below even
their current operational cost, let alone the cost of making capital improvements.
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D. RESERVE ACCOUNTS
The Copyright Office does not in practice have the ability to build a
reserve account across budget cycles, which would give it additional stability
needed to continuously provide services and to invest in capital improvements
given fluctuations in receipts and appropriations. In theory, § 708(d) the
Copyright Act provides that the fees collected by the Copyright Office “shall
remain available until expended.” However, Congress has routinely required
the Office to offset its appropriations request by whatever reserve income it has
accumulated by the end of a fiscal year, thus emptying any potential reserve
fund. By contrast, the Patent and Trademark Office, which also has authority to
build reserves,76 has actually been able to do so. As a result, it was able to
continue to provide services during the federal government shutdown in fall
2013, 77 while the Copyright Office had to close,78 thus halting some copyright
litigation and transactions due to the inability to procure registrations and record
documents. The PTO has also noted that its reserve fund has enabled it “to
maintain progress on IT investments when patent filings (and subsequently
revenue) decreased in FY 2015.”79 The PTO’s practical ability to maintain a
reserve fund is pretty clearly tied to its status as a fully fee-funded agency; the
Copyright Office’s dependence on appropriations weakens it considerably.
III. A FULLY-FUNDED, DIFFERENTIAL FEE COPYRIGHT OFFICE:
OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES
By adopting differential fees, could the Copyright Office generate
sufficient revenues to fully and amply fund itself, without adverse side effects
such as decreases in registrations and recorded documents? The Copyright
Office has been receiving about $20-25 million per year in general
appropriations support,80 so a target figure for additional revenue might be $35
76
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million per year, although, as detailed below, additional funds are initially
needed to catch up after decades of underfunding. Although I am optimistic that
the Copyright Office could become self-sufficient, I concede that the matter is
not entirely clear. However, differential fees would need to be introduced
gradually in any event, and the Copyright Office could gather additional
information about the effect of fee changes as it began to introduce them.
Moreover, whether or not the Copyright Office could do away with support from
appropriated funds altogether, it could certainly greatly reduce its reliance on
them, and that is a worthy goal in itself. This section will begin by considering
the treaty obligations that set outside limits on the types of additional fees that
could be created. It then considers two types of fee differentiation – across time
and across claimants and works – that could be introduced, and considers
economic and legal issues with regard to variations of each. Finally, it considers
the advantages and disadvantages of the goal of self-sufficiency.
A. THE OUTER LIMITS: TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Many readers of this paper will have already wondered whether the
obligations of the United States under the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement would limit the ability of the Copyright Office to impose new fees.
Although they do set some limitations, they should not stand in the way of many
effective fees. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which is incorporated into
TRIPS, famously provides that “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of [the] rights
[guaranteed by the Convention] shall not be subject to any formality.”81
Registration and recordation certainly count as formalities. The Berne
Convention limitations generally apply only to works outside of their country of
origin,82 and thus Congress could impose any fees it wanted to on domestic
works. In fact, only domestic works are subject to the Copyright Act’s
requirement of registration as a condition for filing an infringement suit,83
precisely because the Berne Convention prohibition on formalities does not
apply to them.
Understandably, there may be little political will to impose new
formalities on domestic works alone. Yet Article 5(2) leaves substantial leeway
(the Fiscal Year 2015 Operating Plan included appropriations above and beyond collections of
$17.03 million).
81
Berne Convention (Paris Act) Art. 5(2).
82
See Berne Convention (Paris Act) Art. 5(1) (providing that authors shall enjoy certain rights
in respect to works “in countries of the Union other than the country of origin”). For an
exception, see id. Art 5(3) (“[W]hen the author is not a national of the country of origin of the
work for which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same
rights as national authors.”).
83
See 17 U.S.C. § 411.
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with regard to registration requirements for foreign works as well. Most
importantly, the United States has always interpreted the Berne Convention not
to require the provision of the extraordinary remedies of statutory damages and
attorney’s fees. Thus, even after joining the Berne Convention, it has continued
to require all works, domestic and foreign, to be registered before the
commencement of infringement (with a grace period after publication) as a
condition of obtaining those remedies.84 That likely provides a far broader
incentive to register than the requirement of registration before infringement
litigation. And in that regard, copyright registration is quite similar to federal
trademark registration: both provide additional protection, but neither is
necessary for basic recognition of copyright and trademark rights respectively.
As noted above, federal trademark registration is subject to renewal, and
copyright registration could be as well; the availability of statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees upon infringement could lapse if a copyright owner decided not
to renew its registration for a work.
In addition, the basic term of copyright guaranteed by the Berne
Convention is only the life of the author plus fifty years, while the basic term of
copyright in the United States is twenty years longer. This has led some,
including former Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante, to argue that the United
States could impose a renewal requirement, or a maintenance fee similar to those
imposed on patents, as a condition of extending copyright protection for the last
twenty years of the maximum term.85
B. FEE DIFFERENTIATION ACROSS TIME: RENEWAL FEES
Creation of a requirement to renew copyright registrations is attractive
for a number of reasons. First, it allows registrants to test whether a work will
be economically successful before deciding whether spend more to secure
enhanced protection for it for a longer time. Second, while generating more
revenue for the Copyright Office, renewal registration also increases the quality
of copyright information. When renewing, applicants will provide updated
information about the identity and contact details of the copyright owner. Third,
as long as the failure to renew leads only to the loss of the additional remedies
of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees (and perhaps to the loss of the
presumption that the owner on the original registration certificate remains the
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owner of the work), the imposition of a renewal requirement should not violate
the United States’s treaty obligations.86
For a generation of attorneys and scholars who fought to eliminate
formalities in U.S. copyright law and promote U.S. accession to the Berne
Convention,87 the prospect of a renewal requirement of any kind will generate
reflexive opposition. More specifically, some will fear that a renewal
requirement could be a “trap for the unwary,”88 even if the consequences of
failure to renew would only be loss of enhanced remedies and factual
presumptions, rather than loss of copyright protection altogether. Yet those fears
can be addressed in part by precautions adopted for patent and trademark
renewals, such as the provision of a six-month grace period for renewal even
after the deadline has passed.89
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How much revenue a renewal registration requirement could generate
depends in part upon its timing. Over the past 25 years, the number of
registrations received annually by the Copyright Office has stayed close to the
range of 500,000 to 600,000. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, renewal was
required in the twenty-eighth year of copyright, which is a relatively long time
after originally obtaining protection. The average renewal rate for all works
registered from 1909 through 1963 is about 14%.90 If 14% of 500,000
registrations were renewed every year, that would only be 70,000 renewals
(assuming a one-time renewal requirement), which at a renewal fee of $100
would generate only $7 million. Fourteen percent may be too low an estimated
renewal rate, however, because the renewal rate increased fairly steadily from
1937 (for works originally registered in 1909) to 1991 (for works originally
registered in 1963). By 1991, the last year of the renewal requirement, about
21% of registrations were being renewed.91 A 21% rate of renewal of 500,000
renewals at $100 would bring in $10.5 million.
An alternative would be the trademark model of requiring multiple
renewals at some specified interval – in the case of current trademark law, every
10 years. First renewal rates for trademarks – renewals made ten years after
initial registration – have been running in the range of 28% - 33%,92 and rates
for second renewals, made 20 years after registration, in the range of 22% 27%.93 Thus, for example, if in the year 2037 copyright registrants were
renewing registrations originally made in 2017 and 2027, and if there were
500,000 registrations in each of those years, a 30% renewal rate for 2027
registrations and a 25% renewal rate for 2017 registrations at a $100 renewal fee
would generate $27.5 million in revenue. Of course, there is no reason to think
that copyright registrations would be renewed at the same rates as trademark
registrations, but the fact that copyrights were renewed at a rate of 21% after 28
years in 199194 suggests that 10- and 20-year renewals would likely be higher
than 21%.
One drawback of creating a renewal registration requirement is the likely
delay between creation and first receipt of fees. When Congress introduced
maintenance fees for patents and increased the frequency of trademark renewals
from 20 years to 10 years, it did so only prospectively. Thus, the PTO did not
90
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receive its first patent maintenance fees until three-and-a-half years after they
were created, and did not receive a full complement of first-, second-, and thirdperiod maintenance fees until eleven-and-half years after they were created.
Similarly, the PTO did not see its first set of ten-year trademark renewal fees
until ten years after they were created. Whether or not Congress could
constitutionally impose a renewal requirement on copyright registrations that it
had already granted, one could imagine that the political opposition to doing so
would be even greater than the opposition to renewal fees generally. Thus, a 10year renewal requirement, created in 2017, would not start to produce fees until
2027. That would give copyright owners a great deal of time to get used to the
idea of paying renewal fees, but it would also substantially postpone Copyright
Office benefit from those fees.
Legislation would be needed to create renewal requirements for
registrations; as far as I can tell, the Copyright Office’s current authority to set
registration fees does not encompass the power to limit the term of registrations
or to create a requirement to renew them.
C. FEE DIFFERENTIATION ACROSS APPLICANTS AND WORKS
The Copyright Office should also consider charging different fees to
different applicants, and for different works. As noted above, the Office
currently does offer a modest discount for a “single application” – $35 instead
of $55 – which can only be filed by individual claimants who are also authors,
and which is therefore in essence similar to the “micro entity” discount of the
Patent and Trademark Office.95 Without offering details, the Copyright Office’s
Strategic Plan proposes additional differentiation by entity size.96 Yet there is a
limit to the scale of differentiation on the basis of entity size alone, and 4:1, the
difference between large entity and micro entity fees for many patent services,
may be close to that limit. The problem is that the value of or investment in a
particular invention or work of authorship may not correspond to the size of the
entity that is applying to register it. True, large entities may be less sensitive to
service prices for other reasons – they may be more easily able to raise or borrow
money to bridge the time between paying up-front fees and earning revenue from
their investments, and they may have larger portfolios of inventions or works of
authorship that spread the risk of failure and the rewards of gain. Yet large
entities also file more registration applications, magnifying any fee hike. For
example, a search of the Copyright Office’s online registration database reveals
95
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that Disney Enterprises, Inc. filed over 2300 registration applications in 2015.97
Charging a uniform “large entity” fee of, say, $400 would potentially burden
Disney Enterprises with almost $1 million in registration fees, a result that might
cause even it to reduce registration activity.
Neel Sukhatme has recently argued that patent fees should be
differentiated by the field of technology of the invention.98 He notes that owners
of patents in some fields of technology have demonstrated that they care more
about patent term than owners of patents in other fields. They invested more in
obtaining patents quickly when the method of calculating patent term changed
to include the time from application to issuance, and they have been renewing
at higher rates.99 That evidence, he argues, provides a basis for setting patent
fees higher for inventions in those fields of technology in which patent term
matters more. Copyright fees could similarly be set differently for different
types of works of authorship. There are at least two problems with such a
proposal, however. First, there is no similar evidence available as to copyright
owners’ varying sensitivity to copyright term. There has been no change in the
method of calculating copyright term that could easily generate evidence as to
sensitivity to the length of that term, and the most recent renewal rate
information we have is a quarter of a century old, since the copyright renewal
requirement was abolished in 1992. Second, the value of works of authorship
of a single type likely vary greatly (as do the value of inventions within a single
field of technology), and thus setting a single fee for all works in a category
would likely make registration prohibitively expensive for owners of some of
those works, while getting nowhere near the limit that owners of other works
could easily afford.
A third approach, tied neither to the size of the claimant nor the category
of work registered, would be to charge tiered registration fees for different
statutory damage ceilings, or different packages of registration benefits more
generally. Currently, all registered works are eligible for a minimum award of
$750 in statutory damages, and a maximum of $30,000, upon a finding of
infringement.100 The ceiling is raised to $150,000 if the infringement was
willful;101 the floor is lowered to $200 if the infringer “was not aware and had
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement,”102 and is
See http://cocatalog.loc.gov/ (search for “Disney Enterprises, Inc.” as a name, with a search
limit of the year 2015, performed on December 23, 2016).
98
See Neel Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for Patents,
71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1855 (2014).
99
See id. at 1900-1908.
100
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
101
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
102
Id.
97

23

lowered to zero in certain cases involving reasonable beliefs of fair use by
nonprofit entities.103 However, not every copyright owner is likely to have a
strong desire for the possibility of obtaining an award of statutory damages that
reaches the current ceilings. Although statutory damages are not dependent on
actual damages, they tend to track the likely economic injury to the plaintiff as
well as the egregiousness of the defendant’s behavior. An infringement of a
work such as a stock photograph or a sculpture is unlikely to generate a statutory
damages award at the current ceilings, and if a particular infringement turned
out to be massive – say, use of stock photograph in an advertising campaign that
included billboards around the country and print ads in dozens of major
newspapers and magazines – actual damages in the form of a reasonable
licensing fee would likely be as large if not larger than a statutory damages
award. Some copyright owners also may not be as concerned about
infringement. For example, companies may not be particularly worried if
commercials for their products are posted on YouTube, thus further promoting
their wares; academic authors are usually more concerned about spreading their
reputation than monetizing their articles.
Registrants who believe that their works are likely to be of lower value,
or who are not particularly interested in protecting the copyright value of their
works, could pay substantially less for registration, while receiving a registration
with a lower statutory damages ceiling. One could imagine, for example, four
tiers of registrations: (1) a registration with a truly nominal fee, say, $2, that
would afford the holder no statutory damages at all; (2) a registration that cost
$30, with a statutory damages minimum of $200 and a maximum of $5000; (3)
a registration that cost $60, with a statutory damages minimum of $400 and a
maximum of $15,000; and (4) a registration that cost $120, with the current
statutory damages minimum of $750 and maximum. Obviously, it would take
further study to set the precise number of tiers, and the fees and minimums and
maximums associated with them.
One could conceivably adjust the other benefits of registration as well.
For example, the lowest tier of registration might not involve examination of
copyrightability by Copyright Office examiners (which would substantially
lower the cost of Copyright Office processing); that tier would then not carry
with it the presumption that the registered work contained copyrightable subject
matter.104 However, the question would then arise whether such a registration
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would satisfy §411 and allow the holder to bring an infringement lawsuit.105 Part
of the logic of the § 411 requirement of registration as a prerequisite to litigation
has been that it serves as a filter, discouraging litigation by those who may not
have copyrightable works, and that it provides courts with an expert opinion on
copyrightability.106 A registration that issued without examination could not
perform those functions. The presumption that the facts stated in the registration
certificate are true107 should probably accompany all levels of registration, since
that presumption is probably justified as much by the public airing of those facts
in the Copyright Catalog as by any Copyright Office examination of those facts.
Whether attorney’s fees would be afforded by all registration tiers is also open
to question, but insofar as prevailing defendants are always eligible for an award
of attorney’s fees, under the same standard applied to prevailing plaintiffs who
have a timely registration,108 providing all registration tiers with the benefit of
eligibility for attorney’s fees would tend to even the playing field and deter
stonewalling by defendants in valid infringement cases. Moreover, stripping
away too many benefits could leave copyright owners with too little incentive to
register, even with nominal registration fees.
A tiered registration system based on varied limits on statutory damages
allows and prompts copyright owners to value their own works, and it is those
owners who are probably in the best position to value their works – certainly
better than Copyright Office employees. To the extent that tiers of fees based
on the size of the entity applying or the category of work have the goal of
indirectly detecting the value of the work, tiers of fees based on statutory
damages floors and ceilings should much better serve that goal. Tiered fees
based on estimated work value have at least three advantages. First, if it is
equitable to place a somewhat larger portion of the costs of administering the
copyright system on those who own works of higher value, and who therefore
benefit more from that system and are in a better position to support it, tiered
fees could be an effective means of achieving that equity. Second, tiered
registration makes some form of registration affordable for every copyright
owner, and would therefore tend to maximize participation in the registration
See 17 U.S.C. §411 (providing that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim
has been made in accordance with this title”).
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system, and provide the public with information about the largest possible
number of works. Third, if the fees for the tiers are properly adjusted, tiered
registration should maximize revenue for the Copyright Office, since owners of
works who would not be deterred by paying higher fees would do so, while many
of those who would not pay a high fee would still end up paying a lower fee.
To be sure, a tiered registration system with varied statutory damages
ceilings also has some disadvantages. First, applied as a one-time front-end
choice, it forces copyright owners to value their works in conditions of
comparative uncertainty. A system that allowed copyright owners to “buy up”
to a higher tier at any time – with the proviso that the higher tier remedies would
be applicable only to infringement that commenced after the date of conversion
– would reduce that problem. Shifting the recovery of some costs to back-end
renewal fees would also help. Second, in deciding what statutory damages
ceiling to pay for, a copyright owner may take into account, not only the value
of the work, but the likelihood that it will be infringed, and the likelihood that
actual damages will be provable. Forcing those whose works are more likely to
be infringed, or those who will have a more difficult time proving actual
damages, to pay more for registration, may not be desirable. Third, varied
statutory damages ceilings may also be attacked as perpetuating and rendering
more complex a copyright “caste system,” in which more sophisticated, better
capitalized applicants get more assistance from courts than individual creators
with limited budgets.109 Whether that is an entirely fair characterization of the
registration system is beyond the scope of this Article, but even if there is a
concern about extending additional benefits and remedies to those who
participate in the registration system, tiered registration would allow more
copyright owners to have at least some of those benefits.
The Copyright Office already has authority to vary registration fees to
different applicants, since it is able to set fees that are “fair and equitable and
give due consideration to the objectives of the copyright system.”110 However,
it cannot currently vary the benefits afforded by registration; those are all
uniformly provided by statute. Hence, tiered registration, under which the
consequences of registration varied, would require legislation.
D. SHOULD THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE BE SELF-SUSTAINING?
For an argument that the provision of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees upon registration
creates such a caste system, see John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright: Registration,
Cultural Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright Militancy, 24 Berkeley Tech. L. J.
1397 (2009); for a similar observation, see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 454
(2009).
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Before concluding, I want to address directly the issue of whether the
Copyright Office should seek to be self-sustaining – an issue that is separate
from that of whether it should charge differentiated fees, and which will almost
certainly generate more skepticism and opposition in the copyright industries.
The Copyright Office has argued that it is appropriate to set fees to
recover only part of the costs of its activities, because “many of the services of
the Copyright Office benefit not only individual copyright owners but also the
general public, for example, by providing the public with a searchable database
of copyright registration and ownership information.”111 Likewise, in its most
recent Strategic Plan, it contends that it should receive funding, not only from
fees, but from “annual appropriated dollars that reflect the value of its services
to entrepreneurs, the public, and the economy.”112 It is difficult to see, however,
how in these respects the Copyright Office differs from the Patent and
Trademark Office. The PTO also provides searchable databases to the public;
its services also have value to entrepreneurs, the public, and the economy; and
it also engages in policy research and advising.113
Of course, there are some reasons to seek out funding from general
appropriations. Since Congress has in fact been willing to appropriate in the
range of $20-$25 million per year of general taxpayer revenues for the Copyright
Office, why would the Office want to end that? Cessation of appropriations
from Congress would leave the Office with an absolutely enormous hole to fill,
so in the short run, at least, it is much easier to ask Congress for money on the
grounds that the Office’s operations benefit the public as well as authors and
copyright owners. Moreover, when the Copyright Office asks for comments on
fee proposals, it receives scores of them, but only from service users who oppose
or express concerns about higher fees, arguing that they impose serious burdens.
In the most recent fee-setting rulemaking process, the Office received 144
comments, but not a single one came from a taxpayer complaining that her hardearned dollars were being used to subsidize services being provided at belowcost to one particular sector of the economy.114 Since the Copyright Office only
111
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ever hears comments from one side,115 it is no wonder that it pursues a strategy
of setting most fees at well below cost and seeking taxpayer appropriations to
make up the difference.
It cannot be denied, however, that the strategy of charging below-cost
flat fees, and asking Congress to make up the rest, has for decades been able to
provide the Copyright Office only with what it itself has called a “shoestring
budget,”116 resulting in a raft of service deficiencies. If there is any reason for
authors and copyright owners to support a fully fee-funded Copyright Office it
is this: A self-sustaining Copyright Office would in the long run be a much
healthier, better-functioning, and more stable Copyright Office. That would
provide substantial benefits, not just to the general public, but to the copyright
industries. Before copyright industry members reject that possibility, they
should at least ask themselves whether the self-sustaining PTO provides patent
and trademark services, and otherwise supports the patent and trademark
systems, in many ways that are better than the Copyright Office currently can
for copyright, and whether they cannot imagine Copyright Office improvements
that could benefit them substantially.
There are two more reasons why the Copyright Office should perhaps
refrain from trying to become fee-funded. First, it is possible that the benefits of
copyright registration (and of document recordation) are not sufficiently
valuable that registration applicants and document remitters will pay enough for
them to support the Office’s services and activities. Copyright registration
benefits are certainly less valuable than the benefits of obtaining a patent.
Without obtaining a patent, an inventor can only protect an invention as a trade
secret, and many inventions can be reverse engineered, rendering trade secret
protection ineffective. Thus, the value of patent protection can approach the
entire value of the invention, while the value of copyright registration never
equals the entire value of a work of authorship, since basic copyright protection
attaches automatically upon fixation of the work.117 However, for those works
that retain value over time, the benefits of copyright registration last for the
entire copyright term, which is much longer than the term for patents.

that fees were too low came from a group of copyright owners arguing that Licensing Division
filing fees for cable systems and satellite operators were being set too low; if those fees are set
too low, Licensing Division costs are recovered, not by taxpayers, but by the complaining
copyright owners.
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Copyright registration benefits may also be less valuable than the
benefits of registering a trademark. Although federal trademark registration is
not necessary for many aspects of protection, it carries such benefits as
nationwide protection for a mark;118 an opportunity eventually to gain the status
of incontestability;119 and in the case of intent-to-use registrations, the ability to
gain pre-use protection for a mark.120 Unlike trademark registration, copyright
registration does not increase the geographic area of protection, nor does it
enable incontestability or provide for pre-use protection. As explored above,
however, copyright registration does afford a number of valuable benefits,
including statutory damages and attorney’s fees in an infringement suit.
Lastly, one might worry that a fully fee-dependent Copyright Office
might act in undesirable ways, either with respect to applications for registration
and documents submitted for recordation, or with respect to the policy positions
it takes. Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman have argued that the PTO’s
fiscal reliance on post-grant fees have adversely affected its decisionmaking,
leading it to be more inclined to grant patents that will generate more post-grant
fees, due to maintenance fees and other post-grant charges.121 Harold Wegner
has argued that the very substantial fees that the PTO receives from requests for
continuing examination have skewed its incentives.122 Could Copyright Office
decisions on registrations be similarly distorted by a differentiated fee structure,
particularly one that differentiates over time? At first glance, this seems much
less likely, simply because standards of copyrightability are so much lower than
standards of patentability, and applications for copyright registration are denied
or modified far less frequently than patent applications.123 The Copyright Office
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has very little room to increase the percentage of registration applications it
grants, and would not gain much additional revenue by granting every last
application it received. Thus, although grant patterns should be monitored for
possible distortions, the somewhat remote potential for such distortions should
not be a reason to refrain from considering back-end registration fees.
Would a self-sustaining, fee-funded Copyright Office likely take
different positions on copyright policy issues, because it would be more
beholden to the users that are paying the fees, in the way that a nonprofit
organization might be beholden to the donors that support it? This also seems
unlikely. The fees that the Copyright Office charges are for services and rights
that have their own intrinsic value, independent of any policy advice the Office
might or might not give. Copyright owners value the presumption of validity
that a certificate of registration gives, and the statutory damages and attorney’s
fees that registration affords in case of infringement, and the legal protections
provided by recording documents. Thus, they will keep registering works and
recording documents regardless of whether they approve of the policy advice
that the Copyright Office gives. Of course, the Office does have a financial
interest in aspects of registration and recordation policy that affect its revenues
from those activities, and its policy recommendations in those areas should
perhaps be more closely scrutinized. However, the Office already has a major
stake in registration and recordation when over half of its budget comes from
fees for those services, and it is already difficult for its advice to be impartial;
little changes in that regard if the Office becomes wholly supported by those
fees.
None of this is to say that that Congress should cut off appropriations to
the Copyright Office tomorrow, and force it to raise its entire budget from fees.
As noted above, the Copyright Office could almost certainly not become selfsufficient without revenue from some sort of registration renewal fees, just as
the PTO is dependent on patent maintenance fees and trademark registration
renewal fees. Yet if the Copyright Office created a renewal registration system
tomorrow, it could likely do so only prospectively, which means that renewal
revenues would only start to appear when the initial registration period was over,
most likely a decade or more from now. Moreover, decades of underfunding
mean that the Copyright Office needs a great deal of money just to catch up to
the twenty-first century. In its 2016 Provisional Information Technology Plan,
the Copyright Office has estimated that it would need about $165 million over
the next five years to modernize its IT infrastructure124 – about $33 million per
year above and beyond its normal budget. The Office would have a much harder
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time raising that level of funding from fees, and should not be expected to. Thus,
the goal of self-sufficiency is a long-term goal only, and appropriations, even
increased appropriations, would be needed in the meantime.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Copyright Office has suffered for decades from underfunding, as it
has depended on a combination of essentially flat, front-end fees and
supplementary Congressional appropriations to meet its budget needs. As a
result, it has been unable fully perform its functions, in spite of laudable efforts
to do as much as it can with its limited resources. Congress should consider
authorizing the Copyright Office to charge differentiated fees for its services,
both across time through creation of registration renewal requirements, and
between different works and registrants. Congress should also consider
authorizing the Copyright Office to set fees at rates sufficient to cover all of its
costs, not just the costs of the services it provides, and to cover the costs of both
current operations and capital improvements. The Copyright Office should also
be able to fund a reserve account, enabling it to continue operations and
investment in capital improvements even in case of emergencies or temporary
shortfalls in fee collections. Because some new fees would only start to generate
income in many years, and because the Copyright Office has fallen far behind
due to past underfunding, Congress should for the time being continue to provide
appropriated funds to the Office, and should in fact substantially increase
funding. Yet the benefits of self-funding are substantial enough that the
Copyright Office should begin to move in that direction, whether or not it is
eventually able to attain that goal, and whether it remains in the Library of
Congress, becomes independent, or finds some other institutional home.
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